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I will begin by stating my interest lies in resistance. The beginnings of this 
project sprouted from an experience at the Hamburger Bahnhof museum of 
Berlin, in late fall of 2009. I visited the Hambuger to see a retrospective 
exhibition of the work of Joseph Beuys—an artist who I then only vaguely 
remembered from an obscure art history textbook, but an artist who has now 
become a brilliant North Star in my pantheon of cultural revolutionaries. The 
museum stands tall in white marble at the end of a long, gated courtyard. Once 
an open train station, the interior space is flooded with natural illumination. 
Tall ceilings expand the volume of the gallery; upon entering I felt dwarfed 
and cold. But despite the luxurious space, I was most intimidated by the 
obvious distaste the ticket attendant displayed for my clothing. And I was 
most perturbed by the unapologetic security guards who swept between 
installations and sculptures at an unnatural pace.  
 I approached a cast iron sculpture set in the far corner of the gallery. 
Like an alien pyramid, it rose up from the ground but jutted its apex toward 
my throat, not sky. I moved closer to observe a wrinkling in metal. And 
immediately, as if my impertinence were anticipated, I was ordered to stop 
and retreat. A thin, black tape ran along the ground surrounding the 
sculpture—the symbolic reminder of a barrier. I had not failed to see it, but I 
had ignored it. And the fierce bark of the security officer reminded me of how 
powerful such imagined barriers are.  
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 As the deadline for this thesis approached, I began to feel 
disheartened. (I doubted myself, I was certain my final comments in this paper 
would be considered naïve. Among countless other things this venture has 
inculcated in me a deep respect for writers, and has precipitated my own 
confidence in writing.) After a morning of reading and tedious citation work, I 
fled the library for the abandoned Jamesville Rock Quarry which is located 
East of 481-South. I had heard tales of an Earthwork hidden in the basin of 
this quarry—a deep triangular recession in the rock, which is tiled with small, 
white stones. According to legend, during spring, after a rain, the ramp fills 
with water; the stones turn turquoise. Earthworks such a this one—works of 
environmental art-- provide the point of departure from which I later argue 
certain art-spaces can foil the commodification process. I was eager to come 
across one on my own.  
 I scanned a satellite image of the quarry to learn the terrain. After 
throwing my body over a rusted, chain link fence, I walked around the 
wooded area that forms a perimeter to the basin. I was looking for a security 
tower, a guard, cameras, activity—anything that might suggest my presence 
was unwanted. Broken shards of rock tumbled ahead of me, as I crawled 
down a steep pitch to the flat bed of the quarry. An hour passed; I had yet 
failed to find the narrow crevasse in the earth. And just as I had resolved to 
cross the great expanse of space to search the west side of the basin, I heard 
the low rumbling of a vehicle approaching behind me. I sighed deeply, already 
troubled by the encounter I knew would soon occur.  
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 I was informed that afternoon trespassing, in New York State, is a 
serious crime. This experience with the law—this firsthand confrontation with 
forbidden spaces—refocused my attention on the questions I pursue in this 
project. And even after working toward an open conclusion, the question of 
how to challenge those forces that retain the power to forbid land from my 
wanderings still arrests my thought.  
 
This is the perspective I sought; this is the work that lured me into Jamesville 
Quarry but which remains an enticing mystery:  
William Bennet, Abandoned Earthwork, 1976-1986, Jamesville Rock Quarry, 
New York.1 
 
                                                 
 1 The Center for Land Use Interpretation, Jamesville Quarry (Culver 
City: The Center for Land Use Interpretation, 2010) [database on-line] 
http://ludb.clui.org/ex/i/NY3185/.  
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 When I express my interest in resistance, I do not propose that our 
greatest struggle concerns the elimination of black-taped areas in museums 
(although that objective may be entailed in this project.) Nor do I endeavor to 
offer a critique of museums. Susan M. Pearce2  has exposed the relics of 
colonial thought still operating within the administration of museums in 
Europe and the U.S.; Judith Kapferer3 has denounced the sacrifices imposed 
on artists whose work is subsumed into the highly curated and esoteric ranks 
of the most prestigious art collections. (Nor is my project is to explore the 
interior proceedings of petty court.)  Though perhaps still incomplete, these 
critiques have inspired in me the curiosity that I assuage through the course of 
this study. And this curiosity concerns, namely, wherefrom the incredible 
suffocation I experienced in the Hamburger? In what space, beyond the 
confines of the museum or gallery space, does/can art occur? What are the 
conditions of possibility for a work to challenge existing structures of order, 
oppression, and ideology? And possibly the most important question--what 
are the processes of a resistance?  
 This thesis is the project of evoking a conception of art spaces that 
provoke alternative ways of being in the world. But more simply, it is an 
inquiry into the question: Why is the space of resistance important?  
 
 
                                                 
 2Susan M. Pearce, Museum Studies in Material Culture,  (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1999.) 
 3 Judith Kapferer, State and the arts: Articulating Power and 
Subversion, (New York: Bantam Books Ltd., 2003.) 
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Beginning with Earthworks: The Role of Space and Time  
 Visiting a museum is a matter of going from void to void. Hallways 
 lead the viewer to things once called 'pictures' and 'statues.’ 
 Anachronisms hang and protrude from every angle. Themes without 
 meaning press on the eye. Multifarious nothings permute into false 
 windows (frames) that open up into a variety of blanks. Stale images 
 cancel one's perception and deviate one's motivation. Blind and 
 senseless, one continues wandering around the remains of Europe, 
 only to end in that massive deception 'the art history of the recent 
 past'. Brain drain leads to eye drain, as one's sight defines emptiness 
 by blankness. Sightings fall like heavy objects from one's eyes. Sight 
 becomes devoid of sense, or the sight is there, but the sense is 
 unavailable. Many try to hide this perceptual falling out by calling it 
 abstract. Abstraction is everybody's zero but nobody's nought.4  
 
 Robert Smithson’s artistic career, largely dedicated to the creation of 
earthworks, testified to his distaste for museums. Smithson found museums— 
the industry of high art, appraisal and curatorship in general—to threaten the 
efficacy of a work of art. Art, he believed, was something to be lived, 
experienced and felt; art endeavors to communicate concept, and evoke 
response. He believed industry built around the trade and possession of art is 
antithetical to art’s objective, insofar as it confines art, narrows its audience, 
apotheosizes it, and hoards it. As we witness the expansion of this industry 
from the great marble columns of Bloomsbury and Parisian pyramid into the 
streets of quotidian consumption we become bystanders to the 
commodification of art.  We become witnesses, of a kind, to the 
                                                 
 4 Robert Smithson, “Some Void Thoughts on Museums”, Selected 
Writings from Robert Smithson, 1967. [database on-line]  
http://www.robertsmithson.com/essays/void.htm.  
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mummification of culture. “Museums are tombs,” Smithson wrote in February 
of 1967, “and it looks like everything is turning into a museum.”5 
 In defiance of the tyranny the industry of high art exacts upon artists, 
art, and public, Robert Smithson along with many other artists of his era 
began conceiving work that would occur outside tomb-like spaces. Whether 
by coincidence or purpose, as artists embraced the move past gallery walls the 
earthworks movement asserted profound desertions from the common practice 
of institutionalized art.  
 Suzaan Boettger describes monolithic Earthworks constructed during 
the 1960s. She writes:  
 These earthen works appeared as an open grave, a disorderly mound 
 of dirt, an arrangement of bins of sand or rocks and, when made on 
 open land, were located not in felicitous pastoral countryside but in 
 remote wilderness terrains accessible only over rough dirt roads.6  
 
 This image of an open grave, the depression in earth that is both 
hollow and hallowed, inverts the model of tomb-like spaces Smithson so 
passionately spurned. The tomb memorializes the deceased and encloses the 
decay of the body. Outside its walls, the stone shields us from observing the 
organic processes of death; the structure is engineered to convey timelessness, 
immortality. The tomb shields us from entropy. And like the museum, it 
intends to preserve its tenants from the progression of time.  
                                                 
 5 Smithson, “Some Void Thoughts.”  
 6 Suzaan Boettger, Earthworks: Art and Landscape of the Sixties 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 24.  
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 Earthworks, however, are no such monuments. Earthworks do not seek 
to be memorialized; the construction and material of earthworks lends the 
work to disintegration. And as such capricious works, they clash against the 
intensive conservationist purpose of the museum. Earthworks seek no 
representation outside the material of their medium. Earthworks are rock, dirt, 
grass, water, clay, light, ice, tides. Earthworks are not abstracted from their 
material composition, but rather their composite material lend to the totality of 
their conceptual objective. 
 The earthwork Spiral Jetty is one such work that demonstrates 
Smithson’s particular revulsion against acquiescing to museums as exclusive 
art-space, and is easily his best known creation.  Construction on Spiral Jetty 
began in April of 1970 off the shore of Utah’s Great Salt Lake. By assembling 
saline crystals, mud and endemic rock, Smithson extended a 1500-foot long 
salty tendril into the lake. 
 Earthworks, like Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, accomplish something that 
seems an intrinsic consequence to their production and existence outside the 
museum space. That is, earthworks naturally become rooted in their 
environment; these works are dedicated spatially and temporally to a finite 
location, and the location participates not only in their conceptual objectives 
but also in their formal composition. As the tide rises and falls on Great Salt 
Lake, the visibility of Spiral Jetty, fluctuates and adopts striking variations in 
color; the black basalt rock of its foundation manifests as vibrant blood or 
coral pink, according to its level of submergence and the blanket of 
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microorganisms that coat the rock’s surface. And in the years since its initial 
creation, time has affected its own metamorphosis on the structure; subtle 
erosion perpetually alters the work, as salt crystals blossom and pebbles break 
away from rock. The physical object of Spiral Jetty, from the moment of its 
inception, was not a static art object, but conceptually addressed the organic 
processes of entropy and decay.  
 
 
Robert Smithson, Spiral Jetty, April 1970, Great Salt Lake, Utah.7 
 
 The earthworks movement continues to challenge the notion of what 
constitutes an art space. Outside the temples of curated culture, earthworks-
minded artists such as Robert Smithson push against the modes of selection 
that seek to distinguish High Art from all else. I offer this brief introduction to 
earthworks and their history to whet the reader’s appetite for compelling (and 
                                                 
 7 Estate of Robert Smithson, “Robert Smithson Gallery,” Robert 
Smithson 2010. [database on-line] 
http://www.robertsmithson.com/index_.htm.  
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unusual) works of art. While I do not believe earthworks are unique in their 
existence outside the museum space, I suggest these works present certain 
properties that frustrate the process of their commodification—properties that 
I argue allow for the potential of radical political and social provocation. Our 
struggle begins with the battle against the commodification of art. And the 
anchor of resistance to this foe rests upon our ability to escape the 
commodification process.  
 
 
Space or Site as an Obstacle to Commodification 
 
The greatest transgression committed by the Industry of High Art occurs in its 
attempts to dogmatize the canon of Art History. Through institutions that aim 
to preserve monoliths of our purported cultural history, this industry produces 
the social capital of art. It lionizes individual works, apotheosizes artists, and 
consequently alienates the public from art in two ways: we confront a tacit yet 
distinct division between high art that merits our veneration, and the works of 
the amateur. (We may wonder if there is meaning to the title “artist amateur” 
other than the state of being yet unaccepted by the ruling body of 
connaisseurs d'art.) Furthermore, the industry devotes itself to the monetary 
evaluation of art. When this second activity takes place, the art object begins 
the transformation into a commodity.  
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 We must invest our attention in the peculiar non sequitur that is the 
commodified art object to understand how it alienates the art object from its 
audience, and ultimately strips it of its operative purpose.   
 Consider this: In May of 2004, Sotheby’s auction house in New York 
sold Picasso’s 1905 painting Garçon à la Pipe for more than $104,000,000.8 
The painting passed into the private possession of an anonymous individual. 
New York University professor of art history and world-renowned Picasso 
expert Pepe Karmel commented on this sale the following day, “I’m stunned 
that a pleasant, minor painting could command a price appropriate to a real 
masterwork by Picasso. This just shows how much the marketplace is 
divorced from the true values of art.”9 What sense of “value” does Karmel 
express? He points to a notion of aesthetic value, which is essentially 
constituent to the work. As such an essential part, it is inextricable from the 
painting Garçon à la Pipe; its aesthetic value does not accidentally occur, nor 
is it exteriorly imposed. A theory of essential aesthetic value allows Karmel to 
maintain that innately, some objects constitute art due to their having the 
property of aesthetic value, while other objects do not.10 To the degree that a 
minor work such as Garçon à la Pipe is less aesthetically valuable than a 
major work of Picasso’s, Karmel ostensibly assumes the minor work should 
command a lesser market price. His confusion rests in his misunderstanding of 
                                                 
 8 “Picasso Painting Sells for $104 Million,” BBC News, May 6, 2004 
[database on-line] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3682127.stm. 
 9 “Picasso Painting Sells.”  
 10 Gregory Currie, “Supervenience, Essentialism and Aesthetic 
Properties,” Philosophical Studies 58.3 (October, 1988) : 243-257. 
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how value in the market occurs, particularly for art objects. For even if a 
theory of essential aesthetic value were soundly contended (and few reputable, 
contemporary philosophers seem to find it defensible) it would fail to address 
the chimeric apparition of exchange-value—a value that is not located in the 
physical object, but comes into being in the helical political, economic and 
social nexus. Indeed, we may also wonder how the value of such a work is 
determined in the market.  
 I rely on Marx to guide my quick survey of this question, since a 
discussion of how art becomes commodified is but an interstice before our 
devotion to the subject of what that system of commodification potentially 
imposes on our selves. In volume I of his work, Capital (1867), Marx defines 
a commodity as “an external object, a thing which through its qualities 
satisfies human needs of whatever kind and is then exchanged for something 
else.”11  He further explains, “It is not the exchange of commodities which 
regulates the magnitude of their value; but, on the contrary, that it is the 
magnitude of their value which controls their exchange proportions.”12 That is 
to say, the magnitude of value concentrated in an object is relatively 
determined by the value of other objects in the market. The pecuniary figure 
that asserts a commodity’s exchange value is not essential to that object-- it is 
not a physical property, it is not inherent in the object. The market presents the 
                                                 
 11 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveling (London: Lawrence & Wishard, Ltd., 2009), 125. 
 12 Marx, Capital, 69.  
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space of exchange in which a commodity’s commensurate magnitude of value 
materializes.  
 In such a market-relation of commodities, we might indicate the value 
of Garçon à la Pipe not as $104,000,000, but as 1,733,333 college textbooks; 
as 69,333 laptops; as 14,857,143 pounds of coffee…etc. Such equivalence 
relations can be made, according to Marx, because these equivalences operate 
without differentiation of the particular labor involved in the production of 
these distinct commodities; the labor invested in the production of a singular 
commodity becomes abstracted into general labor, or, the socially necessary 
labor time required for the production of that commodity. It is through this 
abstraction, and the competition of the market, that similar or even identical 
commodities (pens, for example) may originate from different producers, yet 
exact an approximately uniform exchange value when sold.13 (Consider that 
one single laborer produces pens by hand, making only one pen per day. Her 
competitors each have pen factories, and produce one hundred thousand pens 
per day. Given that the pens are of equal quality, the first pen maker will be 
forced to sell her single pen at the price of her competitors’ pens, though this 
exchange of her pen for the market price may not reflect the necessary labor 
time required to produce the pen by hand.)  
 The use-value also proportionately affects the magnitude of value an 
object has once it becomes a commodity. The use-value of a commodity 
connotes the function of the commodity, or the social need for the commodity. 
                                                 
 13 Marx, Capital, 69.  
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The use-value of a commodity is therefore relative to the consumer. But it 
may be contended that the use-value of such a work as Garçon à la Pipe, or 
every relative instantiation of an art object’s use-value, is superlatively so; that 
is, one person may regard the work as an appalling eyesore, and another find it 
enthralling—a necessary totem to their aesthetic health. But I doubt whether a 
work of art is initially recognized as an object with an aesthetic and 
consequentially social use-value is left to subjective opinion of the consumer, 
also understood in this case as the work’s audience. Rather, the use-value of a 
work, and accordingly its magnitude of value, is the product manufactured by 
the Industry of High Art.  
 Like all commodities, the labor time encompassed within a work of 
art, determines the exchange-value, or equivalence relation the work will 
procure on the market. However, given Marx’s explanation of how all 
productive labor becomes abstracted into general labor, the labor that yields a 
creative work presents an interesting anomaly.14 The production of art does 
not comply with an averaged/standardized socially necessary labor time. The 
labor of the artist is not abstracted from her product; the undifferentiated labor 
of all artists cannot be congealed into the production of art as a homogenous 
commodity. It is the labor invested in the creation of a work that yields the 
                                                 
 14 Marx distinguishes productive labor as that labor which ultimately 
bears surplus value, but notes how the kind of work that is considered 
productive labor is historically and socially contingent. Yet, among those 
productive labors are a variety of enterprises, the diversity and specification of 
which are necessary to society. Because labor is so divided, the definite work 
of producing pens, for example, is not perceived in the market as pen-work 
but is synonymous with the general category of productive labor and is hence, 
abstracted from the specific work of pen making.   
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varying degrees of its evaluation (often by appealing to an essential aesthetic 
value, previously expressed by Karmel.) Yet, an ancillary function exerted by 
the Industry of High Art develops the estimate of a work beyond its purported 
possession of aesthetic value. To mobilize art as a commodity in the market, 
the Industry of High Art performs the labor of producing social capital of a 
work of art, in order to incur an assumed use value. It is the labor of the High 
Art Industry, the work of museum and gallery curators, appraisers, auction 
houses, et al., to produce the social capital of prestigious works and therefore 
to determine the magnitude of value such works will assert in the market.  
 The motivation behind the efforts of High Art Industry to inflate (and 
instigate) use-value for art lies in the need to perpetuate its own survival as a 
producer-apparatus. This industry exerts a parasitic, managerial relationship 
with art—which it must first assert as a commodity via the production of 
social value of art objects——and then mediates the exchange of the art 
object, with commission. Envisioning the art object as the site that is itself 
capitalized by the owner, Marxist geographer David Harvey likens the art 
object to land and uses the analogy of rent to describe its superintendence.  
 It is not the land, resource or location of unique qualities which is 
 traded but the commodity or service produced through their use. The 
 land or resource is directly traded upon…Scarcity can be created by 
 withholding the land or resource from current uses and speculating on 
 future value. Monopoly rent of this sort can be extended to ownership 
 of works of art (such as Rodin or a Picasso) which can be (and 
 increasingly are) bought and sold as investments. It is the uniqueness 
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 of the Picasso or the site which here forms the basis for monopoly 
 price. 15 
 
 Like land, he suggests, the owner of a work of art accrues profit from 
the artwork by restricting access to it. Both land and the art object have 
limited maximum “occupancies;” land and art objects are spatially restricted 
and fixed. Unable to modify the fixity of land or the art object, the owner 
resorts to imposing temporal restrictions on access to the work, and so 
capitalizes on the art as a site. Paying for periods of access or use, Harvey 
points out that we often rent the experience of an art work no differently from 
our apartments. And the variables that determine the marketability of land and 
art undulate over the same plane: scarcity and uniqueness, the socially 
perceived use value, and the site’s aesthetic value all fuel competition and 
increase its price in the market.16 That capitalism responds analogously to land 
and art by exploiting access begs the question: which sites are themselves 
insular to the capitalist system?  
 Initially it may seem this query offers bleak hope for the existence of 
such spaces. But take heart! We must recognize this industry retains curatorial 
power and the power of access by maintaining the construction of its own 
authority. Precisely, this industry presumes to determine what is true art, what 
is truth in art. A stamp of approval, or recognition from this body of experts 
admits a work of art to the market, determines its magnitude of value, and 
                                                 
 15 David Harvey “The Art of Rent: Globalization, Monopoly and the 
Commodification of Culture,” Generation Online, 2010. [database on-line] 
http://www.generation-online.org/c/fc_rent1.htm. 
 16 Harvey “The Art of Rent.” 
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monopolizes its audience.17 And in simply noticing the false pretense of this 
prerogative we are already reorienting ourselves toward a site outside the 
market space.  
 Once the commodification and exchange transpires, the work becomes 
immured in the Industry’s project of preserving. For only in motion, in its 
potential for further exchange, can the commodity accrue further capital. (The 
art object as a commodity becomes a site of investment capital.)  The most 
esteemed works are elected into the analects of art history-- an irreversible 
shift into the canon of cultural import. But once this shift takes place, the 
revelatory power behind the work, and in some cases its conceptual impetus, 
is severely obstructed if not destroyed. 18 
 The direct threat the commodification process poses to artists as it 
attempts to insulate their work from temporality is addressed by Robert 
                                                 
 17 John Berger, Ways of Seeing, (London: British Broadcasting 
Corporation and Penguin Books, 1972).  
 18 For example, consider the coup achieved by the Tate Modern 
collection of London in 2008: the work of street artist Banksy was installed on 
the museum’s monolithic north face. Prior to this commission, Banksy 
obtained underground infamy by asserted himself as a radical artist-terrorist 
by illegally and secretly installing his work in private galleries and museums. 
His other works of street art, painted on urban surfaces belonging to both 
public (State) and private property, denoted Banksy as a criminal. Yet his 
intrepid, unapologetic creations and choice of site led to his explosion as a 
sub-culture/pop-culture celebrity. While this social capital evolved exterior to 
the Industry of High Art, it was nonetheless seized. The Tate Modern 
successfully obtained an original Banksy for its collection, which transformed 
his work into a Tate-specific site—the access to which could not only be 
controlled, but capitalized upon. And by divorcing his work from its original 
dedication to challenging the use of public (State) spaces—by further 
asserting its project of preserving work that was initially removed by state 
forces and prosecuted—the Tate Modern nullified the natal power of Banksy’s 
work. 
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Smithson in his essay, “A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects.” He 
writes,  
 …Any critic who devalues the time of the artist is the enemy of art  and 
 the artist. The stronger and clearer the artist’s view of time the more he 
 will resent any slander on this domain. By desecrating this domain, 
 certain critics defraud the work and mind of the artist. Artists with a 
 weak view of time are easily deceived by this victimizing kind of 
 criticism, and are seduced into some trivial history. An artist is 
 enslaved by time, only if the time is controlled by someone or 
 something other than himself. The deeper an artist sinks into the time 
 stream the more it becomes oblivion; because of this, he must remain 
 close to the temporal surfaces. Many would like to forget time 
 altogether, because it conceals the “death principle” (every authentic 
 artist knows this). Floating in this temporal river are the remnants of 
 art history, yet the “present” cannot support the cultures of Europe, or 
 even the archaic or primitive civilizations; it must go into the places 
 where remote futures meet remote pasts.19 
 
 In so far as works such as Spiral Jetty, and the general set of 
earthworks resist an ontologically static objectivity; to the extent that they 
may not be materially possessed, nor physically exchanged, they resist 
commodification within the network of exchanges that constitute the Industry 
of High Art. We can more clearly understand how these works frustrate the 
commodification process if we recognize that the constant metamorphosis 
exacted by time—the work of erosion, in the case of Smithson’s Spiral 
Jetty—metaphysically establishes these works as events rather than art 
objects. Because, the time of capital is one of persistence; it is a future time 
committed to the expansion of value. And like a small crack in the rock of an 
                                                 
 19 In Art in Theory 1900-2000, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 881. 
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ominous mountain, it is the fault from which an alternative, anti-commodity 
art may spring.  
 
 
Earthworks’ Peculiar Properties and the Time of Capital 
 
Upon reflection on how the problem of commodification of art occurs, we 
observe its reliance on at least two fundamental processes: firstly, art as a 
commodity is exchanged in the market physically. The commodified art lends 
itself to physical circulation in a similar sense that any thing-- a coat for 
example-- may circulate among consumers, pawnbrokers, and secondary 
consumers. Access to the work is controlled and turned for profit.  
 Secondly, commodified art also occurs as an instantiation of social 
capital. This social capital mutates into investment capital during circulation, 
which only sustains as such if the longevity of the art object may be ensured. 
Expressed more fully, the investor who purchases monetarily the social capital 
of the art object hopes only secondarily that she or he can resell the object for 
a surplus value in the future, and firstly assumes that the work will still exist at 
this future date. Hence, persistence through time is an integral facet of the 
process in which art objects become investment capital in the form of a 
commodity. This tacit assumption of perpetuity spawns an extended network 
of securities and cultural dogmas built around the preservation of both the 
object and its social capital—networks we can circuitously sense with the 
observation that an education in art history rarely deviates from the 
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established canon (so undemocratically composed), or a moment’s 
consideration of why the security systems installed in the Louvre, the Tate 
Modern, and the Uffizi Gallery boast such menacing security technology.  
 The move, then, toward the creation of art that resists commodification 
lies in the work’s innate capacity to refute at least these two integral steps to 
its introduction to the market. It must defy physical exchange in the market, 
and perhaps more importantly, must preclude itself from the investors’ interest 
in perpetuity. Hence, works of interest to this discussion present these two 
essential properties: 1) the work being of a temporally reactive nature, and    
2) the work being spatially sensitive. What conditions of possibility lie in the 
space, or site, or grounding, of those works that avow these properties and 
therefore orbit the nowhere-land outside commodification?  
 My meditation on this question is rooted in an ontological method. 
When we investigate into the ontological properties of an object, or being, we 
inquire after the ways that object or subject exists in the world—in reality. An 
ontological consideration examines which characteristics of a thing determine 
its interaction with, and participation in, reality. For example, we may ask 
whether a table is a table in virtue of having a horizontal surface supported by 
a base. Or, whether a table is rather something upon which we can set plates, 
or onto which we can toss our car keys. And in doing so we would be 
considering the ontology of the table. Furthermore, ontological questions seek 
to edify how objects relate to the world. These questions may address physical 
relations—such as what happens to a ball of clay when I mould it into a 
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sculpture, then crush it with my palm (does the identity of the clay change 
over time from ball to sculpture?) And in another vein, ontology addresses the 
relations subjects construct with abstract objects, structures, and systems such 
as ideology, identity, language, and orientation.  
 The work of Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, 
Objects, Others offers a foundation for the discussion of what potential non-
commodity art spaces may offer. Specifically, she provides us with the tools 
for theorizing the precipitation of a relationship between such an artist, such a 
work, and such an audience. Ahmed theorizes the “grounding” of our 
orientation in space to objects and subjects. She writes: 
 Perceiving an object involves a way of apprehending that object. So it 
 is not just that consciousness is directed toward objects, but also that I 
 take different directions toward objects: I might like them, admire 
 them, hate them, and so on. In perceiving them in this way or that, I 
 also take a position upon them, which in turn gives me a 
 position…Orientations involve directions toward objects that affect 
 what we do… Turning toward an objects turns ‘me’ in this way or that, 
 even if that ‘turn’ does not involve a conscious act of interpretation or 
 judgment.20 
 
An object grounds us, orients us in the world, by evoking the internal 
orientations already present within our conscious bodies. And yet grounding is 
furthermore, existential. Grounding, or orientation, is the fulcrum of our 
experience. It is both a starting point from which we base interaction with 
things and others, and the lens that both augments and distorts the cast of our 
participation in the world. Internally, hidden within the nuanced behaviors, 
learned convictions and comportments—veiled by our predilection for 
                                                 
 20 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 27-28.  
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individualism—we each respond to the world according to those imbibed 
ideologies that orient us. These ideologies steer our actions, our thoughts, our 
formulation of new ideas and opinions. They pierce the core of our being, 
guiding even our emotions. Ideologies form the program according to which 
our world operates; and as programmed bodies in that world, we reflect, 
project, and impress this program onto others. We are victims, and 
perpetrators; oppressed, and oppressors. Such is the existential grounding 
according to which we orient ourselves in space.  
 Objective and existential groundings—both the physical and abstract 
objects that orient our selves—operate within an entwined duality. We receive 
sensory information regarding the material world around us; we organize this 
information into a model. Our knowledge, the order according to which 
everything in this material world subscribes, is then projected into that space. 
This projected organization becomes reified in material objects, and illustrates 
the twofold objective and existential grounding from which we participate in 
the world. Stimulus of one inextricably affects the other.  
 So, unlike a road-sign that orients our direction in space, ideologies 
that prescribe certain interior orientations are not concrete objects. Imagine 
them instead as an internal point of departure—an interior grounding—and 
concurrently the social pattern of these departures. The State for example, 
notes Louis Althusser in his essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” is not in fact an object but is a function of State power. Its 
functioning requires an internal grounding in its constituent bodies that a 
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priori acknowledges State power. Similarly, other organs of control, of 
repression and subjection, are conducted through our bodies and our internal 
groundings. We may imagine Ideology according to this abstraction. 
Intangible, yet felt; invisible, yet present; ideology is the event-horizon we 
approach within the activity of every social relation, as well as object-subject 
relation. “What is represented in ideology is not the system of the real 
relations which govern the existence of individuals,” writes Althusser,  “but 
the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they 
live.”21 
 Ideologies such as Religion, Education, Family, Communications, and 
Culture are not only mechanisms of exerting and maintaining state power, but 
are also “the site of class struggle,”22 according to Althusser. These perform 
complementary functions: ideologies establish the status quo of relations 
between classes, races, genders, etc. while simultaneously preserving those 
relations. Ideologies react, like programs or autoimmune diseases, to the 
introduction of new ideas, ways of being, modes of production, by subsuming 
them into the extant hegemonic ideology. Ideologies react, and neutralize. 
Dominant modes of production seem to digest deviant modes, or those modes 
of relating and producing that challenge (even in the most minute, isolated 
spaces) the ideologies insulating our social infrastructure from critique. And 
given that ideology thus manifests in material and social relations, as well as 
                                                 
 21 In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 165. 
 22 Althusser, 165. 
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initially within the individual, the process of observing the subject’s 
orientation toward bodies in space—becomes one in which we can question 
our orientation toward (and receptivity of) ideology. 
 Consider this example of how objects (exterior groundings) and 
ideology (an internal grounding) coalesce to orient a subject. Ahmed describes 
a scene in which the philosopher Husserl sits down at a table in his study, 
ready to embark on philosophical reflection. The table itself is a place of 
work, of productive activity of a determined nature (namely, writing.) The 
table grounds Husserl’s actions in this way, toward writing. The table is also 
arranged so that Husserl’s front is directed away from other rooms in the 
house. His family, his domestic responsibilities are placed in the background 
by the orientation stipulated by the table.23 These objects ground Husserl in 
the activity of philosophy. Ahmed proposes what this orientation toward the 
desk and Husserl’s philosophical project turns away from: 
 By reading the objects that appear in Husserl's writing, we get a sense 
 of how being directed toward some objects and not others involves a 
 more general orientation toward the world. The objects that we direct 
 our attention toward reveal the direction we have taken in life. If we 
 face this way or that, then other things, and indeed spaces, are 
 relegated to the background; they are only ever co-perceived. Being 
 oriented toward the writing table not only relegates other rooms in  the 
 house to the background but also might depend on the work done to 
 keep his desk clear, that is, the domestic work that might be necessary 
 for Husserl to turn the table into a philosophical object. Some things 
 are relegated to the background to sustain a certain direction, in other 
 words, to keep attention on the “what” that is faced. Perception 
 involves such acts of relegation that are forgotten in the very 
 preoccupation with what it is that we face.24 
                                                 
 23 “Orientations: Toward a Queer Phenomenology.” GLQ: A Journal 
of Lesbian and Gay Studies 12.4 (2006): 543. 
 24 Ahmed, “Orientations,” 544.  
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The orientation toward the desk allows Husserl to forget certain features of his 
workspace. Insofar as grounding in space identifies the conditions of 
possibility for events and subjects in that space, we should ask what 
conditions make it possible for Husserl to write. 25 For it is not only those 
objects which are present on the desk, but the invisible work to keep his desk 
clean, to keep his children from interrupting his study, that make his enterprise 
possible. Husserl’s orientation in this example not only turns his back to the 
space occupied by the family, but is made possible by the housekeeping labor 
of his wife.26 His orientation is determined in part by an interior grounding 
built upon an ideology of the family, according to which the conditions for 
Husserl’s writing are established.  
 But what if an invasive object were present on the desk? An object that 
triggered a radical reorienting of Husserl’s activity? A dirty rag might do the 
trick—the same innocuous rag used to dust his desk, left in the corner near the 
inkwell. Such a rag might evoke a crisis or re-orientation in the philosopher. 
No longer able to turn away from the necessary labor that provides for his 
own study, would Husserl be recalled to reckon with institutionalization of 
marriage? Would he be reminded of the differentiation of labor assigned to 
each gender? And could this rag do more than arrest his attention on his 
acquiescence to the ideology of family, but in fact provoke critique, if not 
resistance? 
                                                 
 25 Ahmed, “Orientations,” 544.  
 26 Ahmed, “Orientations,” 547. 
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 Ahmed asserts that a queer orientation in the world might be one like 
this in which we invert our perception backwards and inwards—behind us in 
space, as opposed to an orientation locked within the fore-grounded objects 
directly before us. A work of art, like any object, may serve as the exterior 
grounder onto which we can reposition ourselves and subsequently our 
orientation. It may be the magnetic object outside our bodies that beckons us 
over there. Art that occurs outside the commodity space—an abstract space 
that is less intrinsically structured to support dominant ideologies—can be an 
alternative pole for the internal compass that is grounding. Art existing in this 
space can challenge us to ask why we may be here and not over there in the 
first place. 
 I contend in this way we can conceive of art as a grounding from 
which we can orient ourselves in opposition to those ideological apparatuses 
that form the social superstructure of our productive and reproductive 
processes. 
 Almost everything hitherto presented is theoretical. We need tangible, 
defined, historical illustrations of the relationship between the 
commodification process of art and ideology; between art that challenges 
existing orientations and those subjects who are re-oriented. I suggest the 
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The NASA Artists Commissioning Project 
 
The inception of the National Air and Space Agency occurred in 1958 with 
the National Aeronautics and Space Act. The Soviet Union had only recently 
launched the satellite Sputnik in 1957; NASA’s debut occurred in the frenzied 
aura of fear that marked the height of the Cold War. The threat of mutually 
assured destruction bred fierce tension within United States and Soviet 
relations. These tensions posited a difficult marketing obstacle to the nascent 
Space Agency. In an era of clandestine government operations, exploding 
advances in technology, and the continual threat of nuclear apocalypse, NASA 
faced the difficult challenge of presenting its objectives to the world as 
research and exploration-oriented and not an extension of the United States’  
military complex.27 The longevity of NASA relied heavily upon its political 
and public image, both at home and abroad.  
 James Webb, a key administrator in the early management of NASA, 
proposed a solution to this problem in the beginning of 1960. A campaign 
would be instituted to educate the public on the objectives of space 
exploration, and would employ contemporary artists to provide the medium of 
this didacticism. This campaign was named the NASA Artists Commissioning 
Program, and recruited American artists such as Robert Rauschenberg, 
Norman Rockwell and Jamie Wyeth.28 Webb and other NASA administrators 
                                                 
 27 Anne Collins Goodyear, “NASA and the Political Economy of Art, 
1962-1974,” in The Political Economy of Art, ed. Julie F. Codell (Madison: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2008), 192. 
 28 In The Political Economy of Art, 192. 
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invited a curator of the National Gallery, Lester Cooke, to select artists and 
direct the commissioning agenda.  
 Cooke and Webb conducted the commissioned works within the vein 
of NASA’s political objective by stipulating explicit themes each work must 
elicit. Anne Collins Goodyear describes these objectives in her essay, “NASA 
and the Political Economy of Art, 1962-1974.” She writes, “By committing 
resources to Art, which promised to outlast the ephemeral benefits of media 
coverage, NASA found a way to translate and communicate its objective of 
dominance in extraterrestrial exploration into qualities broadly compatible 
with human excellence… The patronage of art promised to serve the space 
program by shaping public perceptions of it and thus promoting the agency in 
the eyes of Congress and the Public.” 29 
 We see from the very beginning, this project encompassed a definite 
teleology; artists were expected to produce works that engineered a particular 
political identity for NASA. This identity posited the power of American 
nationalism by conveying images of heroic American astronauts, the 
American flag, and American landmarks. They united technological zeal with 
American patriotism. NASA encouraged artists to appeal to nostalgic 
references to the time of Westward American expansion. This ideology, 
further accompanied by the vision of reaching the new Promised Land, 
advanced via these works a new (and yet recycled, redirected) American 
narrative. NASA would be the instrument for realizing the new American 
                                                 
 29 In The Political Economy of Art, 193.  
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dream—conquering the final frontier. Artist Paul Calle, one of the greatest 
contributors to the project, expressed the sentiment, “I like to use the analogy 
of oneness that I see between Neil Armstrong’s boot sinking into the dust of 
the moon and the moccasined foot of a man like John Colter sinking into the 
snow as he entered Yellowstone River Valley for the first time.”30 To achieve 
a successful re-orienting of the public toward NASA, the state invested its 
power in producing works that would communicate an explicit archetype, and 
which would furthermore lend themselves to the commodification process.   
 Among those works commissioned by this campaign, Norman 
Rockwell’s The Longest Step (Grissom and Young Suiting Up),  (1965), and 
Paul Calle’s, Mercury and Gemini series unequivocally capture the themes put 
forth by this project’s administrators. And for the purposes of our 
investigation, these paintings offer specific examples that demonstrate the 
process of commodification that was so integral to the triumph of the NASA 
Artists Commissioning Project. In order for these works to act as grounding 
for the new, pro-NASA ideal, a point of contact—a medium for exposure—
was required through which the public would encounter these themes. The 
state relied upon its citizens’ primary capitalist activity to self-effect this 
exposure. 
 For example, the image of Rockwell’s The Longest Step (Grissom and 
Young Suiting Up) (1965) was printed and distributed in the April 20, 1965 
                                                 
 30 In The Political Economy of Art, 193. 
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edition of LOOK Magazine.31 Selected works from Calle’s Mercury and 
Gemini series became the reproduced image on a line of U.S. Postal Service 
stamps in 1967. The state utilized the organic circulation and consumption of 
commodities to conjure from within the public’s quotidienne consumerism the 
grounding of the new space-culture and ideology. 
 And here they are: 
 
Norman Rockwell The Longest Step (Grissom and Young Suiting Up), 1965.32 
 
Paul Calle, U.S. Postal Service Stamp “Gemini Space Twins,” 1967.33 
                                                 
 31 In The Political Economy of Art, 194.  
 32 Norman Rockwell, The Longest Step (Grissom and Young Suiting 
Up), 1965. (Rutland: The Norman Rockwell Museum of Vermont, 2010) 
[database on-line] http://www.normanrockwellvt.com/FramedPrints.htm. 
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 The NASA Arists Commissioning Project demonstrates the symbiosis 
between capitalism and the production of state ideology, but particularly it 
testifies to how these forces seize art as a site for orienting individuals toward 
prescribed ideologies. In this case, the prescription induced a re-shaping of 
public opinion toward space-exploration alongside nationalist and patriotic 
appetites. But given that this method of locating art in the space of 
commodification to provide grounding for state-sponsored re-orienting, we 
may be wise to heed similarly constructed projects that pursue more nefarious, 
surreptitious goals.  
  
 
Joseph Beuys and the Building of Social Sculpture 
 
The work of German artist, professor, and political activist Joseph Beuys 
(1921-1986), will in no way be thoroughly analyzed in this brief, 
demonstrative case study. I hope only to offer a snippet of Beuys’ oddness in 
the beginning, so that it does not become a point of disturbance later. 
 Throughout his artistic career, Beuys created a wealth of material 
works in painting, sculpture, installation, film, and drawing. He expanded the 
treasury of art theory in written treatise; He broke new ground in the sphere of 
performance art with such performances as “I Like America and America 
                                                                                                                               
33 Larry McGlynne, “Stepping on the Moon with Paul and Chris 
Calle,” Space Artists, [database on-line] 
http://spacearttribute.blogspot.com/2008/06/stepping-on-moon-with-paul-
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  31 
Likes Me,” (1974) during which he spent a three-day visit to New York in the 
sole company of a coyote, isolated from people, American culture and media, 
protected only by a blanket.34 And as a radical political figure, Beuys declared 
a cultural war on governing bodies and tenets of hegemonic society. A 
professor of art in Düsseldorf, Germany, Beuys would hold free and open 
lectures to all who would attend—a practice that put him at odds with not only 
his own university but also the greater clique of academic institutions of his 
time. Though only a small informative capsule of Beuys’ life and work is thus 
given, I hope I have communicated that Beuys was not a person who 
capitulated to dominant modes of thought, behavior, or intellectualism in 
society.  
 Humanist social theories, however, did arrest Beuys’ attention. As 
Beuys pushed the limits of avant-garde art in the 1960s, and into the 
beginning of the 1970s, his fascination with humanism engendered what 
became his theory of social sculpture.35 Comprised in this theory is the 
premise that society and art are indivisible from one another, and as such, 
every member of society is an artist who is responsible for the form society 
assumes en masse. Claudia Mesch describes how Beuys’ understood the role 
of the individual in social sculpture. She writes,   
 Beuys would render his theory, which posited the existence of radical 
 individual freedom or agency in the contemporary world, into the 
                                                 
 34 Götz Adriani, Joseph Beuys: Leben und Werk (Köln: DuMont, 
1981).  
 35 Theirry de Duve, “Joseph Beuys, or the Last of the Proletarians,” in 
Joseph Beuys the Reader, ed. Claudia Mesch and Viola Michely (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2007), 134-150. 
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 practice of inter-subjective communication within the sphere of art. 
 Beuys believed that deep social and political reform could be realized 
 beyond the cultural sphere in this art… As Beuys implemented it, the 
 exchange of individual opinions within an open public dialogue and 
 debate comprised social sculpture; a functioning and unmediated 
 public sphere therefore became the realization of social sculpture.36 
 
 Beuys himself explained the details of how social sculpture works 
through the co-creative labor of its members over the course of talks held and 
recorded at Documenta V (1972).37 Conversation on the subject of social 
sculpture and intense debate over the best technique to instigate a grass-roots 
(Volksabstimmung) cultural revolution became, essentially, Beuys 
contribution to Documenta V—an installation, he would call it. In the 
following excerpt from this prolonged dialogue, Beuys expresses the keystone 
to his theory of social sculpture: every member of society is an artist.  
 We have to ensure that it [society] is structured organically so that it 
 functions like a person functions internally, like the organs 
 function…To realize [free democratic socialism] one needs the model 
 of decartelization38 on a large scale, so that the domain of culture, all 
 that which makes up intellectual life, is administered on its own… I 
 just want to encourage everyone to take this into their own hands, the 
 education process. Everyone that already can or who could at the 
 moment--we don’t need a brilliant talent somewhere. Precisely the 
 ability that one has at the moment must be put to work…No area of 
 life will be free from this concept [everyone is political] in the future. 
 That means that people will recognize the social organism, and they 
 must think within this context. They must not only think about schools 
                                                 
 36 “Institutionalizing Social Sculpture: Beuys Office for Direct 
Democracy through Referendum Installation (1972),” in Joseph Beuys the 
Reader, ed. Claudia Mesch and Viola Michely (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2007), 198-217. 
 37 Documenta is a 100 day-long art exhibition held in Kassel, 
Germany, every five years.  
 38 Decartelization is the transition of a national economy from 
monopoly control by groups of large businesses, known as cartels, to a free 
market economy. 
  33 
 but also about the legal system and economic structures. They must 
 always think through the entire social organism.39  
  
 Beuys draws a parallel--a coordination-- between sculpting of the 
individual, and the restructuring of social systems such as the legal and 
education systems.  In this model, the individual assumes responsibility for 
generating change in society; in doing so she orients her body, her activity, 
her productivity, toward social reformation. And in doing so, she averts her 
body, her activity, her productivity, away from reproducing the hegemonic 
orders of ideology and repression currently in place. Her subjective 
grounding—the conditions of her consciousness that allow for certain possible 
actions—offers the springboard for her reification of new potential political 
apparatuses; this grounding offers a launch pad for new conceptions of her 
relationship to the state, to modes of exchange, and to others.  Social sculpture 
occurs as the product of concurrent interiorly and exteriorly directed 
sculpting.   
 Beuys shepherded such an instance of social sculpture through the 
work 7000 Eichen (7000 Oaks), which was launched in Kassel, Germany in 
1982. 7000 Eichen would be the planting of 7000 oak trees, each attended by 
a short pillar of basalt rock that marked it as one of the seven thousand 
                                                 
 39 Joseph Beuys, “Every Man an Artist: Talks at Documenta V by 
Joseph Beuys”, ed. Clara Bodenmann-Ritter, in Joseph Beuys the Reader, ed. 
Claudia Mesch and Viola Michely (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 189-
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plantings.40 Over the course of the five years, the planting-sites for 7000 
Eichen were proposed by neighborhood councils, elementary schools, charity 
organizations, student groups, individual residents— the “organs” of society 
directed and designated the space of this geographically fragmented yet 
conceptually amalgamated earthwork and sculpture.  
 
 41       42 
 
                                                 
 40 Lynne Cooke, “Joseph Beuys: 7000 Oaks,” Dia Art Foundation, 
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Council England, “Josephy Beuys 7000 Oaks: Land Art Meets Urban 
Renewal.” Arts and Ecology, 
http://www.artsandecology.org.uk/magazine/artworks/project-6. 
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 Beuys’ 7000 Eichen binds those peculiar features of earthworks with 
an ideology of community and citizenry intrinsic to his concept of social 
sculpture. The site of their planting speaks to the power of the public—each 
citizen’s self-capacity to change the landscape. With disregard for the 
distinction between public and private space, each planting of these oaks and 
pillars was an also ecological protest.  
 I believe that planting these oaks is necessary not only in biospheric 
 terms, that is to say, in the context of matter and ecology, but in that it 
 will raise ecological consciousness--raise it increasingly, in the course 
 of the years to come, because we shall never stop planting. Thus, 7000 
 Oaks is a sculpture referring to peoples' life, to their everyday work. 
 That is my concept of art which I call the extended concept or art of 
 the social sculpture.43 
 
And this act of protest—the social sculpture that is the planting of 7000 
Eichen—cannot be usurped by the market. Though materialized in pith and 
stone, these objects that constitute the merely physical features of the work are 
deeply rooted in the land; the relocating tentacles of museum hoards cannot 
incarcerate this work.  7000 Eichen responds to and renews with entropy; the 
trees and rock will each respond to passing time at different rates of change. 
(The oaks mature, bud, wither and rot, as the rock slowly becomes chipped, 
sinks lower into the earth, tilts slowly as dirt erodes underneath... These 
elements present how 7000 Eichen defeats the gravitation toward consumer 
capitalism. As 7000 Eichen organically deteriorates—annually germinates and 
shrivels toward extinction—it precludes the capitalist’s pathological desire to 
                                                 
 43 Johannes Stüttgen, Beschreibung eines Kunstwerkes (Düsseldorf: 
Free International University, 1982), 1. 
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make it an object of investment capital; 7000 Eichen cannot be bought, nor 
sold later at inflated prices. But it would undermine the magnitude of this 
work to only focus on its material existence outside the market space.) The 
concept of Beuys’ social sculpture, and particularly of 7000 Eichen, prevails 
beyond its embodiment in physical objects; it is a continuous turning away 
from—a perpetual redirecting, reorienting-- as the powers of repression 
change to adapt to our new forms of resistance.   
 I see 7000 Eichen as an example of what great possibility art retains as 
a grounding for our orientation in this world, in society, not only toward 
ideology but more specifically toward inter-subjectivity. Beuys’ work 
provokes an especially radical reorienting; it works to both instigate and 
constructively direct class struggle.  
 It is not simply that Beuys’ political positions as an artist and German 
citizen fell into alignment with those of the broader proletarian class (although 
that parallel may be evident.) Beuys’ very manner of production in 
conjunction with his theory of the singularity of art and society, addresses this 
reorienting. Beuys created his art outside the sphere of commodity production. 
He asserted his work as an artist as creative labor, not productive labor which 
yields surplus value.  And furthermore, he considered this creative labor not 
unique to himself or for that matter only  the labor of an “authentic” artist; 
Beuys saw this creative labor to be an innate activity to the life of every 
human being, intrinsic to our humanity. He proposed creativity is our natural 
work, and hence rejected the production of commodities as an essential human 
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quality. “Der Mensch ist das kreative Wesen,” Beuys expressed at Documenta 
V. And in saying so, Beuys provides a methodological grounding for how 
capitalism can be challenged by creative beings. Capitalism attempts to 
alienate both the consumers and producers of its commodities from the labor 
that yielded those commodities and corresponding value. But to the extent 
each productive laborer also retains the power of creative labor, we retain the 
potential for working and being outside the modes of producing and 





The beauty of looking to art as a grounding lies in the fluidity and 
multifariousness its potential sites may assume. The site of reorientation can 
be surprisingly simple, even accidental. (The dirty rag left on Husserl’s desk 
speaks to this serendipity.) The site of re-orientation may be congealed in the 
matter of a work, and furthermore in the activity of its creation as in the union 
of oak and basalt and society in 7000 Eichen. Interiorly too, we are grounded. 
And thus ultimately we must recognize our own subjectivity as a grounding in 
this world. This last site of reorientation within our bodies calls upon us to 
address how the creative work of every being as an artist requires an attention 
to how we not only project our creative labor into the world, but how our 
creative labor may be interiorly directed also. It is not enough that we become 
reoriented toward social ideologies by external (art) objects. The project of 
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constructing our internal grounding itself requires sensitivity to those same 
elements embraced by earthworks. Namely, entropy and the critical attention 
to spatial location.  
 Our bodies move continuously through space, and as such locomotors 
we perpetually confront new external groundings. For this reason, the project 
of constructing our internal grounding remains fluid; must forever remain in 
an elastic state. Only by not becoming fixed in rigid modes of production and 
consumption can that internal grounding be a site of resistance. 
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 Museum establishments, curators,  art auction houses, appraisal 
experts, the canon of art history, and the broad record of our cultural 
memory—these institutions aggregate to form the broad network of the High 
Art Industry. Curatorial power—the power to distinguish high art from all 
else—is almost solely monopolized by this industry. Yet without relying on a 
notion of aesthetic essentialism, according to which one could ostensibly 
assert the aesthetic value of a work of art to be one of its innate properties, the 
question of how this industry determines value in art becomes a piercing 
question. We find this industry in fact produces the social capital of the pieces 
it puts forth in circulation in the market; works of art become commodities, 
vehicles for mobilizing capital, and a repository for investment capital.  
 This process of commodifying art begins with works that appeal to our 
mode of accumulation by expecting future returns on investment capital. But 
this seizing of a work of art as a vessel for accumulation assumes that the 
work will persist through time until that investment can be realized. (An 
investor does not pour capital into an object that may disintegrate tomorrow.) 
Furthermore, these objects circulate physical in the market. Perpetuity and 
mobility hence arise as two features of art that facilitate capitalist exchange. 
 Yet some works of art resist this process. Earthworks, for example, do 
not circulate in the market of art exchange. They are rooted in the land; 
earthworks become fixed in their site of creation. Earthworks also undergo a 
metamorphosis over time: they erode, grow, sink, change color, reproduce, 
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breathe, molt, expand. Nor do they appeal to a notion of persistence through 
time. Earthworks constantly move toward a more entropic state. These unique 
and peculiar properties of earthworks frustrate the process of 
commodification, and serve as an example of how art has the capacity to exist 
outside the spaces of capitalist production. What can such art provoke? 
 Our bodies, too, occupy spaces of capitalist production. Our bodies are 
the site of commodification—not only the target, but concurrently the object 
of this process. (Our desires are constantly being shaped, molded, formed by 
exterior forces.) Forces of ideology direct us toward becoming better 
consumers, toward becoming better patriots, toward becoming better mothers 
and fathers and citizens. But for such ideology to have effect, we must be 
receptive to its operation of orienting us toward such ideologies; to be oriented 
by such forces requires that we face the grounding of these paradigms.  
 If we were to turn away, what would happen? If our movement and 
participation in space were not complementary to such forces? Art that occurs 
outside the space of capitalist production (art that does not yield surplus value 
for the capitalist) can lure us into such spaces.  
 One more point to note: Sarah Ahmed develops the idea of how an 
internal grounding also works to construct a point of departure, from which 
we conceive action in the world. This internal grounding, according to her 
theory, is also the sounding board against which all exterior groundings are 
bounced, and checked for compatibility. This internal grounding is not fixed,  
but is malleable and even mercurial. By aligning a critical, internal grounding 
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with site of art work that occur outside the space of capitalist production (an 
external grounding) can we develop a mode of resisting ideology that posits 
resistance as a way of being, a way  of responding to repression rather than 
singular acts of violence?  
 
 
 
  
 
 
